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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

WELLS R. KING, et al.,
*

*

Defendants,

No.
11316

*

GEORGE W. EV ANS and MARTHA R.
EV ANS, his wife,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for the foreclosure of a Uniform
Real Estate Contract as a mortgage and for the recovery of a personal judgment for the resulting deficiency.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The real property covered by the subject Contract (R-11) was sold at Sheriff's Sale under a judgment entered pursuant to a Stipulation between the
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parties. Thereafter at pretrial Plaintiff-Appellant
(hereinafter called "plaintiff") made a Motion for
Summary Judgment aqainst Defendants-Respondents (hereinafter called "defendants") for the
amount of the resulting deficiency. Said Motion was
denied, and plaintiff's Complaint against defendants
was thereupon dismissed by the trial court with
prejudice.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment as a_gainst defendants and seeks the entry of judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against defendants for the amount of
the deficiency.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record herein establishes the following uncontroverted facts. On February 1, 1962, Maurer Development Corp., as Seller, entered into a certain
Uniform Real Estate Contract (R-11) with Wells R.
King and Eliza R. King, his wife (hereinafter called
"Kings"), as Buyers. Thereafter, on November 27,
1963, Maurer Development Corp. assigned and conveyed the Seller's interest under said Contract to
plaintiff and plaintiff has at all times subsequent
thereto been the owner and holder of such interest.
On August 15, 1962, the Kings, as Assignors,
and the defendants, as Assignees, executed a certain Assignment 0£ Contract (R-27), hereinafter
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called "Assignment A," v.rhereby the Kings assigned
the Buyer's interest under said Contract to defendants. Paragraph 3 of Assignment A provides:
"That in consideration of the assionors executing and delivering this agreement, the assignees
covenant with the assignors as follows:
a. That the assignees will duly keep, observe
and perform all of the terms, conditions and provisions of the said agreement that are to be kept,
observed and performed by the assignors.
b. That the assignees will save and hold harmless the assignors of and from any and all actions,
suits, costs, damages, claims and demands whatsoever arising by reason of an act or omission of the
assignees."

On July 22, 1966, plaintiff gave notice to defendants that said Contra.ct was in default and that
plaintiff had elected, pursuant to the provisions of
Paragraph 16C thereof, to declare the entire remaining balance owing thereunder at once due and payable, to treat said Contract as a note and mortgage,
and to proceed immediately to foreclose the same.
On August 1, 1966, plaintiff filed its Complaint herein (R-1).
On March 20, 1967; the Kings, by an Assignment (R-41), hereinafter called "Assignment B", assigned to plaintiff all of their interest in, to and under
Paragraph 3 of Assignment A.
On May 9, 1967, plaintiff moved for Summary
Judgment, which motion was, on May 29, 1967, denied without prejudice to reassert said Motion at
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pretrial. On June 12, 1967, the Court, pursuant to a
Stipulation (R-49) between all parties not in default,
ordered that the subject real property be sold at
Sheriff's Sale without prejudice to any claims that
plaintiff may then have had against defendants for
the recovery of a deflciency judgment.
On July 18, 1967, said Sheriff's Sale was held,
and the subject real property was sold to plaintiff, thereby establishing the deficiency in question.
On April 25, l 968, pretrial was held at which
time plaintiff reasserted its Motion for Summary
Judgment against defendants for the amount of said
deficiency. Said Motion was denied, and on May 28,
1968, Judgment was entered dism1ssing plaintiff's
Complaint against defendants.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
FAILED TO HOLD THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO RECOVER A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
ASSIGNMENT A.

It is admitted that defendants executed Assignment A (R-33). Under the terms of Assignment A,
defendants promised to perform all of the obliga·

5

tions of the Buyers under said Contract and to save
and hold the Kings harmless therefrom.
It is well settled that the assignee of a contract
who agrees to assume the obligations of the assignor
under such contract is liable as a matter of law to
the other party to the contract for any breach thereunder. Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P.2d 465
(1957); Lonas v. Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities
Co., 432 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1967); Barberich v. Pooshichian, 211 P. 236 (Cal. App. 1922); Zeidler v. Burlinganie, 245 N.W. 527 (Mich. 1932); Horvath v. Lefton, 176 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio Common Pleas 1961); Cutler
v. Glenn, 81S.W.2d1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Corbin,
Contracts (1 vol. ed. 1952), p. 857.

The Radley case, decided by this Court in 1957,
is very much in point with this case. In Radley, the
defendant was the assignee of the Seller's interest
in a real estate contract and the plaintiff was the
Buyer. The defendant-assignee denied having assumed the liabilities of the assignor, the assignment
of contract not having contained an assumption
agreement as does Assignment A. The trial court
found, however. that the defendant-assignee had assumed the liabilities of the assignor. This Court held
that, having assumed the liabilities of the assignor,
the defendant-assignee was liable to the plaintiffbuyer for breach of contract as a matter of law.
In the Lonas case, a concern by the name of
Master Builders, Inc., as Sellers, entered into a real
estate contract with a couple named Beck, as Buyers. Master Builders, Inc. thereafter assigned all of
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the Seller's interest in the contract to the appellees
and the Becks likewise assigned all of the Buyer's
interest in the contract to the appellants, who agreed
to perform all of the obligations of the Buyer under
the contract. The appellees subsequently brought
an action against the appellants for breach of contract. In reviewing the case on appeal, the court
discussed the applicable law as follows in 432 P.2d
at 604:
"Appellants contend that the court erred in
finding that they were indebted to appellee, because
the assignment of the contract was an agreement
solely between appellants and the Becks and there
was no privity of contract between appellants and
appellee.
"With regard to contracts for the sale of land,
it is the general rule that the assignee of the purchaser is not liable to the seller for the purchase
price by reason of the assignment alone, and becomes liable only if he assumes that obligation in his
contract with the purchaser. There was such an
assumption of obligation here. In the assignment from the Becks to appellants, signed by both
parties, the appellants agreed with the Becks that
'they will pay the balance due on said real estate
contract and that the balance due thereon will become the obligation of the Assignees,' and that
appellants would 'observe and perform all the
terms, conditions, and covenants mentioned in said
contract * * * .' Since performance of the Becks'
promise to pay the purchase price of the property
would benefit someone other than the Becks, that
is the seller, and would satisfy the Becks' duty to
the seller, the latter was a creditor beneficiary, and

the appellants' promise to discharge the Becks' obligation under the contract created a duty of appellants to the seller to perform the promise. As a
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creditor beneficiary the seller could recover judgment against either the Becks or the appellants or
against each of them as to the purchaser's obligation under the contract. The trial court was correct
in entering judgment against appellants for the
moneys due under the contract." [Emphasis added.]

In Barberich, the plaintiffs, as Sellers, entered
into a contract for the purchase and sale of real property with an individual named Pooshichian, as
Buyer. Pooshichian thereafter assigned the Buyer's
interest in the contract to appellants, who agreed
to perform all of the obligations of the Buyer under
the contract. The plaintiff subsequently brought an
action to forfeit the contract and for breach of contract. In 211 P. at 237-238, the court observed:
"However, the appellants contend that, as assignees of the vendee, they were not obligated to
perform the obligations cast upon the original vendee by the contract, and therefore may not be
charged with damages for a breach of such obligations. The general rule is that the mere assignment
of rights under an execntory contract does not cast
upon the assignee any of the personal liabilities imposed by the contract upon the assignor. [Citations.] But the rule is, of course, otherwise in a case
where the assignee obligates himself to perform the
covenants binding upon his assignor.
"There was no evidence offered upon this question in the instant case, but it is alleged in the complaint:
' . . . that each ':' * * of said defendants
[the appellants] has assumed and promised,
undertaken, and agreed to keep, observe, and
comply with each and all of th.e terms and conditions in said contract contamed on the part
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of the original vendee therein named.

* * *'

"These allegations were not denied by said defendants, and the trial court found that they were
true. Appellants are liable, therefore, for a breach
of these oblieations because of the privity of contract existing between the parties." [Emphasis
added.]

In Zeidler, the plaintiffs as Sellers had entered
into a land contract with an individual named Burlingame, as Buyer. Burlingame thereafter assigned
the Buyer's interest in the contract to Suffrin, who
assumed the Buyer's obligations under the contract.
The plaintiff subsequently commenced an action for
foreclosure of the contract and sought a deficiency
judgment against Suffrin. In 245 N.W. at 528, the
court stated:
"The right of plaintiff to deficiency decree
against Suffrin does not depend upon an assumption
of liability by the latter, of a character which would
produce privity of contract between plaintiff and
Suffrin, as was involved in Sloman v. Cutler, 258
Mich. 373, 242 N.W. 735, a suit at law. If the assumption of liability is effective as between Burlingame and Suffrin, the latter would be subiect to
deficiency decree. Barnard v. Huff, 252 Mich. 258,
233 N.W. 213 77 A.L.R. 259; Hamburger v. Russell,
255 Mich. 696, 239 N.W~ 267." [Emphasis added.]

In Horvath, the court stated the applicable rule
as follows in 176 N.E.2d a.t 879:
"Granted, a mere assignment of a contract does not
operate to cast on an Assignee the liabilities imposed by contract on Assignor . . . but where
the Assignee agrees to assume the obli;;ations H:.:n
the debtor may sue him . . . as a creditor-benefi-
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ciary of the Assignee's contract and it is not necessary for the debtor to discharge the Assignor...."

In Corbin, Contracts (1 vol. ed. 1952) the author
states the rule as follows at page 857:
"If the assignee contracts with his assignor to
discharge the duties of .the assignor to the third
party, the latter is a creditor beneficiary of that
contract. . . . Also, if the assignee fails to perform
his contract with assignor, the third party can maintain suit against the assignee, as a creditor beneficiary of the assignee's contract."

Under the terms of Assignment A, defendants agreed and became obligated as a matter of
law to perform all of the obligations of the Buyers
under said Contract, including the payment of all
sums due on said Contract. The terms of Assignment A are clear and unambiguous. Having agreed
without qualification to pay and perform all of the
obligations of the Buyers, defendants are liable to
plaintiff as a matter of law for the deficiency still
owing under said Contract.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
FAILED TO HOLD THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO RECOVER A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
ASSIGNMENT B.

Under the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Assignment A, defendants promised that they would "duly
keep, observe and perform all of the terms, conditions and provisions" of said Contract that were to
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be kept, observed and performed by the Kings. Under the provisions of Assignment B (R-41), the Kings
assigned all of their rights under Paragraph 3 of Assignment A (R-27) to plaintiff. It is well settled law
that the assignee of rights under a contract acquires
all of the rights and remedies of his assignor under
such contract. Hoffeld v. United States, 186 U.S. 273,
22 S. Ct. 927, 46 L. Ed. 1160 (1902); South High School
District v. McMillin Paper & Supply Co., 49 Utah 477,
164 P. 1041 (1917); Lancaster & Love, Inc. v. Mueller
Co., 214 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1954); Marsh v. Bowen, 6
A.2d 783 (Pa. 1939); Tullgren v. School District No. 1,
113 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1962).
In Hoffeld, the United States Supreme Court held
in 186 U.S. at 276:
"A voluntary assignee is ordinarily invested with
all the rights whi<'h his assignor possessed, with respect to the property . . . . A voluntary assignee
takes the property with all the rights thereto possessed by his assignor .... "

In South High, this Court stated in 49 Utah at 486,
164 P. at 1045:
"It is elementary that the assignee of a mere chose
in action takes· precisely what rights the assignor
had therein, no more, no less."

In Lancaster, the court stated in 214 F.2d at 355:
"An assignee takes the subject of the assignment
with all the ri~hts and remedies thereto possessed by the assignor."
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In Marsh, the Court stated in 6 A.2d at 785:
"The familiar doctrine that an assignee of a nonnegotiable chose in action takes all the rights of his
assignor and is subject to the equities against him
needs no citation of authority."

544:

In Tullgren, the Court stated in 113 N.W.2d at
"The Assignment on its face was complete and
unqualified. It disposed of all the right, title and
interest held by Mrs. Tullgren. In 6 C.J.S. Assignments§ 82, p. 1136, it is stated:
'As a general rule, a valid and unqualified
assignment operates to transfer to the assignee
all the right, title, or interest of the assignor
in the thing assigned .... ' "

Defendants agreed and became obligated
under Assignment A to "duly keep, observe and
perform" all of the Buyer's obligations under the
Contract, and to "save and hold harmless the assignors." Under Assignment B the Kings assigned
all of their rights against defendants under Assignment B to plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff is
entitled as a matter of law in any event to recover
a deficiency judgment against the defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should
reverse the judgment of the trial court dismissing
plaintiff's claim to a deficiency judgment agairist
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defendants and grant plaintiff a judgment against
defendants for the subject deficiency.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Ray G. Martineau
Robert P. Baker
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

